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MEAL TICKETS FOR LIFE? THE NEED FOR EVIDENCE-
BASED EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL REMEDIES LAW 
Joanna Miles and Emma Hitchings, University of Cambridge and University of Bristol. 
Introduction: the socio-economic context 
The law of financial remedies on divorce raises deep questions about the nature of the 
obligations created by marriage and their persistence after divorce. Considerable 
media attention is garnered by high-profile, predominantly “big money” cases, 
especially those that entail joint lives provision – the so-called “meal ticket for life” 
award. Media coverage of Waggott v Waggott ([2018] EWCA Civ 727) perhaps had a 
slightly gleeful tone as it reported Mrs Waggott’s appeal “backfiring” on her loss of a 
joint lives award (e.g. Daily Telegraph, 11 April 2018).  
But, looking beyond the sensational media reporting of the predicaments of the rich, 
illustrated with images of homes worthy of Country Life’s property pages (e.g. The 
Sun’s online coverage of Waggott), what do the data tell us about the experiences of 
the general population?  
Official statistics and nationally-representative survey data indicate that these 
questions still arise in a highly gendered context in which the presence of children is 
critical. Just under half of all divorces feature children of the family under the age of 16. 
(ONS, Divorces in England and Wales: Children of Divorced Couples, 
www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/divorce/da
tasets/divorcesinenglandandwaleschildrenofdivorcedcouples).  Many women still have 
less economic capacity than most men to deal alone with the economic shock of 
divorce, not least thanks to the distribution of childcare and labour market participation. 
The most common organisation of the English family economy, adopted by 1.8 million 
families, is a full-time working father and part-time working mother. Around a quarter of 
mothers with dependent children are economically inactive (i.e. are neither in work nor 
seeking work); less than half of single mothers of children under 2 are in paid 
employment. (ONS, Families and the Labour Market, England: 2017, 
www.ons.gov.uk/releases/familiesandthelabourmarketengland2017).  
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Meanwhile, many fathers say that they want to get more involved in childcare, but 
various cultural, psychological and economic barriers prevent their doing so (see 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (2009). Working better: fathers, family and 
work—contemporary perspectives. Research summary 41. 
www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/research-summary-41-
working-better-fathers-family-and-work-contemporary). And the latest ONS data show 
that women on average still carry out 60% more unpaid work than men (ONS, Women 
shoulder the responsibility of ‘unpaid work’, 
www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours
/articles/womenshouldertheresponsibilityofunpaidwork/2016-11-10.    
Many women clearly incur a considerable ‘motherhood penalty’ – in reduced earning 
capacity and savings/pension accumulation – the impact of which will be felt following 
divorce. (For data overview, see Chartered Insurance Institute, Risk, exposure and 
resilience to risk in Britain today: Women’s Risks in Life – an interim report (2017), 
www.cii.co.uk/consumer/risks-in-life/).  
It is therefore unsurprising that Fisher and Low, analysing longitudinal British 
Household Panel Survey data, found that wives who later divorced had on average 
contributed just 36% of the matrimonial household’s income during the marriage. They 
also found that both the impact of divorce and recovery from it was on average 
considerably worse for wives than for husbands, whose position – measured in terms 
of equivalised household income – by contrast on average improved following divorce. 
(‘Recovery from divorce: comparing high and low income couples’ (2016) 30 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 338; see further analysis in article 
by Fisher and Low forthcoming in the Australian Journal of Family Law.)   
The Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill: evidence-based law reform? 
This is part of the backdrop against which Baroness Deech’s Divorce (Financial 
Provision) Bill [HL] 2017-19 falls to be considered.  
Baroness Deech is a longstanding campaigner for reform, having been prominent in 
academic and public debates since soon after the enactment of the original Matrimonial 
Causes Act scheme (e.g. ‘The Principles of Maintenance’ (1977) 7 Family Law 229). 
Those debates led to the amendments made in 1984 – removing the ‘minimal loss’ 
principle, introducing the clean break provisions and the requirement to give first 
FORTHCOMING IN Family Law – PLEASE DO NOT DISSEMINATE FURTHER  
3 
 
consideration to the welfare of minor children of the family. There is much in current 
public discourse that finds echoes in those earlier debates. Notably, complaints about 
the ‘lifelong meal ticket’ of ‘alimony drones’ that were central then are recurring now: 
see ‘“Meal ticket for life” divorce deals must be stopped, urge law chiefs’ (The Times, 
20 Nov 2017, p 17).  
But as the Law Commission said in 1981, handicapped by the lack of empirical data in 
the area: ‘[W]e have said only that the law is “widely thought to be capable” of 
producing unjust and inequitable results; we have not said that it in fact does so.’ (Law 
Com No. 112, 1981, para 7) Research later conducted by John Eekelaar and Mavis 
Maclean examining pre-1984 outcomes showed that – thanks to the impact of benefit 
rules (withdrawing benefit £ for £ of maintenance received) – maintenance paid to 
female single parent-families ‘rarely had any impact on the total household income of 
that family unless the woman was working full time’. Once child support payments 
ceased on children’s reaching independence, older mothers found that ‘their earning 
capacity had been devastatingly impaired by the interruption of their employment 
pattern’. (Maintenance after Divorce (Clarendon Press, 1986) p 102) So much for the 
alimony drone lifestyle. 
Baroness Deech makes various charges against the current law (see, for example, her 
speech introducing an earlier iteration of the Bill in 2014: Hansard HL Deb col 1490 (27 
June 2014)). These include: its perpetuation of the indignity of lifelong spousal support; 
lack of transparency making the law inaccessible to lay people and obstructive of 
settlement; the high costs of litigation in media-reported financial remedy cases; and 
high awards in ‘big money’ cases that have made London a prime destination for the 
‘gold-digger’. (For an excellent riposte to this last charge, see Thompson, ‘In defence of 
the “gold-digger”’ (2016) 6 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1225: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2887022. And see remarks in 
Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727 at [156], noting that long-term maintenance 
can sometimes be necessary as part of a fair outcome, and expressing understanding 
of counsel’s concern that ‘the expression “meal ticket for life” can be used as an unfair 
trope’.) 
What has been notably absent from debate on the Bill thus far, just as in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, is significant reference to what official statistics and research tell us 
about the reality of financial provision on divorce for ordinary people in ‘everyday’ 
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cases, most of whom (around two-thirds – see MoJ Family Court Statistics Quarterly 
www.gov.uk/government/collections/family-court-statistics-quarterly, table 13) obtain no 
court-ordered income, capital or pension provision at all (by consent or otherwise). 
Little is known about that no-order population, save what we can glean from the 
worrying findings of studies such as Fisher and Low’s. Instead, public and 
parliamentary debate has focused on the atypical (mostly stratospherically high-value) 
cases that attract media attention and from which misleading stereotypes may be 
generated and inappropriately generalised.   
Whilst any good law reform properly seeks to give coherent effect to a particular 
principled view about what the law (and so the affected parties’ underlying relationship) 
should be, any law reform should also be informed by the best available empirical data. 
Without such an evidence-base, reform may both fail to achieve its principled 
objectives and exacerbate existing problems. And so this article now turns to data 
drawn from the authors’ study of financial remedies cases concluded with a court order, 
the vast majority of which are by consent (see MoJ data, above, table 15). Data from 
this study and other sources cast doubt on several charges made against the law. On 
the legal costs incurred on divorce, see the comparatively modest average legal fees 
for divorce and non-marital separation in Aviva’s UK-wide Family Finances Report: 
www.aviva.com/content/dam/aviva-corporate/documents/newsroom/pdfs/Aviva-Family-
Finance-Report-The-hidden-cost-of-divorce-and-separation.pdf). On the suggestion 
that it is the substantive law which foments dispute, see successive studies by 
Eekelaar and Maclean (notably Eekelaar, Maclean and Beinart Family Lawyers: the 
Divorce Work of Solicitors (Hart Publishing, 2000), and our findings that key factual 
disagreements and other non-legal factors are often the problem: Assembling the 
Jigsaw Puzzle: Understanding Financial Settlement on Divorce, (Univ of Bristol, 2013), 
ch 4 www.nuffieldfoundation.org/final-settlements-financial-disputes-following-divorce 
and summary in (2014) Family Law 44: 309-18).   
But we focus in this article on the charge that lifelong support is prevalent, unjustified 
and ‘undignified’ for recipients, and reflecting a ‘victim mentality’ (Baroness Deech, 
Hansard HL Deb 11 May 2018). Our key findings are that: the clean break culture is 
prevalent; spousal support orders are largely confined to cases involving dependent 
children of the family, with scarcely any orders being made in cases without children (of 
any age); there is geographical variation in courts’ use of spousal periodical payments, 
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but this variation may be more a product of local wealth levels and housing costs than 
ideological difference. 
The financial settlement study: data sources 
The data discussed here come from three sources collected for the authors’ study of 
financial settlements on divorce, the first two shortly before LASPO’s legal aid reforms 
were implemented, the third shortly after the creation of the Regional Divorce Centres:  
(i) c. 400 court files from two time periods in 2010-11 and 2011-12, from 
four courts around England; 
(ii) interviews with 32 family solicitors and mediators with experience in 
money cases in the areas in which those courts are situated; and  
(iii) two focus group discussions conducted with District Judges from several 
regions across England, extending beyond the court survey areas. 
The financial settlement study’s court file survey population: a socio-
economic overview 
We cannot claim that the sample is representative of the jurisdiction, but the four 
courts/areas in the first two elements were selected to achieve a spread of different 
socio-economic circumstances. Table 1 shows the economic and occupational status 
of those spouses in the court file survey whom we could classify given occupations on 
the divorce petition, based loosely on the most simplified National Statistics Socio-
Economic Classification tool. (For further detail, see appendix to our article forthcoming 
in the Australian Journal of Family Law.) With the exception of just six individuals (three 
husbands, three wives), we were able to identify all spouses whose occupation was not 
classifiable as nevertheless being economically active. Notably, the court file 
population included a much higher proportion of higher-occupation husbands than the 
general divorced population (compared with Labour Force Survey data from 2015). 
This may suggest that financial orders are more likely to be obtained by couples with 
assets or financial issues on a scale perceived to merit a formalised outcome  – though 
our pre-LASPO sample included several cases that, as a prudent exercise of post-
divorce housekeeping simply perfected a clean break between couples with no assets 
(cf Vince v Wyatt [2015] UKSC 14). For comparison with general population and 
regional income and property data, see figures cited by Douglas in the forthcoming 
special issue of the Australian Journal of Family Law. 
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Table 1: Economic and occupational status of spouses in the court file sample at date of 
petition 
 Husbands Wives 
 N % N % 
Economically active 
higher 160 40.1 114 28.6 
intermediate 50 12.5 83 20.8 
routine/manual 81 20.3 69 17.3 
unemployed 29 7.3 36 9.0 
unclassifiable 48 12 20 5 
Total active 368 92.2 322 80.7 
Economically inactive 
homemaker 0 0 56 14.0 
retired 28 7 15 3.8 
 student 0 0 3 <1 
Total inactive 28 7 74 18.5 
unknown if active 3 <1 3 <1 
All classifiable 348 87.2 376 94.2 
All unclassifiable 51 12.8 23 5.8 
Total 399 100.0 399 100.0 
Table 2a shows the variation in wealth-levels at issue between the four courts and for 
all cases in which spousal periodical payments were ordered. Table 2b shows the 
income levels for those spousal support cases in each court. The median figures 
provide a better indication than means, naturally stretched by high outliers. These 
figures are based on our rough estimates (where broadly calculable, in the face of 
many difficulties) of the total values of capital assets, pension funds and combined 
incomes at stake in each case – there are a number of cases in which we were unable 
to generate the relevant figure, so the averages reported in the tables do not cover all 
cases (for more detail, see our forthcoming article in the Australian Journal of Family 
Law). There is clearly considerable variation in the wealth-levels dealt with by the four 
courts. Reflecting the husbands’ higher-level occupations, cases involving orders for 
spousal support on average involved higher annual combined incomes.  
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Table 2a: combined wealth values by category, for all cases, by court for all cases, and 
for all spousal pp cases in the sample 
  £Non-pension £Pension £Income  
All courts, 
all cases 
mean 583,035 192,834 55,807 
median 117,080 72,437 37,746 
Court A mean 209,090 185,913 47,715 
median 113,326 59,875 37,080 
Court B mean 112,023 112,737 32,949 
median 63,304 44,500 31,475 
Court C mean 174,019 119,438 37,508 
median 72,166 61,146 33,468 
Court D mean 1,863,976 331,817 119,828 





mean 721,970 260,113 84,299 
median 293,300 112,502 78,642 
Note Numbers here are inflated by one very high capital value case (>£10M), without which the means 
would be c.£560K, £237K, and £82K and medians £281K, £103K, £79K. 
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Table 2b: number of orders for spousal pps made in each court, with mean and 




 £Income combined – 
spousal pp cases [NOTE] 
£Income combined – all 
cases 
All cases  mean  55,807 
median  37,746 
Court A 16 mean 64,189 47,715 
median 56,000 37,080 
Court B 3 mean 44,741 32,949 
median 47,928 31,475 
Court C 8 mean 55,570 37,508 
median 37,812 33,468 
Court D 37 mean 117,090 119,828 




64 mean 85,063  
median 77,072  
Note: The figures in this column are based on spousal pp cases in each court for which we had valid 
income data: 15 out of 16 in Court A, all 3 in Court B, 7 of 8 in Court C, 20 of 37 in Court D. If all spousal 
pp cases are included (i.e. including cases with incomplete income data), the income figures in spousal pp 
cases for Courts C and D go down (but are still higher – in D, by reference to the median case only – than 
for all cases in those courts), while those in Court A go up slightly. 
What orders were made, and what happened to the FMH? 
Tables 3 and 4 summarise the frequency in the court file sample of various types of 
court order for spouses’ benefit (child maintenance orders, not included in table 3, are 
addressed below). The fate of the former matrimonial home (FMH) was often dealt with 
outside the order: table 4 shows the destinations of the FMH in all cases, whether by 
order (as in table 3) or not.  
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Table 3: Frequencies of types of final order for benefit of spouse 
Type of order (for benefit of 
spouse, only) 
Number % of total sample with order 
(N=399) 
 
Dismiss all claims 65 16.5 
Spousal periodical payments 64 16 
Lump sum   167 42 
FMH orders   
Outright transfer 129 32 
Sale [note] 86 22 
Mesher 6 1.5 
Martin 3 <1 
Transfer with charge back 7 1.8 
Tenancy transfer 2 <1 
Other key types of order   
Order re other property 86 22 
Pension sharing 72 18 
Pension attachment 1 <1 
Note Plus associated lump sum orders distributing net proceeds of sale – those orders are not included in 
the count for lump sum orders. This figure excludes contingent orders for sale, mostly to be triggered only 
should some other aspect of the deal fail to come together – e.g. transferee of FMH unable to get other 
spouse removed from mortgage 




Table 4: All destinations of the FMH, whether by order or not 
All destinations of FMH Number % of total sample (N=399) 
 
Outright transfer 162 41 
Sale 126 32 
Retained by owner 41 10 
Transfer with charge back 8 2 
Mesher 6 1.5 
Owned by third party 6 1.5 
Martin 3 <1 
Intervening bankruptcy 1 <1 
Tenancy retained by one 20 5 
Tenancy surrendered [note] 15 3.8 
Tenancy transfer 2 <1 
Unclear / no info 8 2 
Note This includes 11 cases where we infer that was the outcome, given evidence on file about the home’s 
tenure or from which tenure could be inferred (e.g. both spouses now renting in new property with zero 
capital and no borrowing declared). 
The clean break: the prevalent practice 
Evidently, clean breaks prevail, both as regards income and capital orders that 
preserve an ongoing link: spousal maintenance featured in just 16% of cases, and 
Mesher (and similar) orders in relation to the FMH and pension attachment were rare.  
Other data from our study indicate that this clean break culture is driven by many 
couples’ preferences:  
 [M]arried couples almost always want a clean break of some form or another – 
even if it’s a clean break as to capital and income. (Mediator 1) 
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[C]lients like clean breaks. They don’t want to have any more bother with the 
other party, and even if a clean break isn’t - you know, the safeguarding aspect of 
it, the nominal in case something should go wrong, they don’t want the link and I 
don’t think they’ve got the stomach for going back to court again if something 
does go wrong. (Solicitor/mediator 27) 
A self-sufficiency focus was also evident from some judges’ responses to the case 
study (involving a primary carer wife of three children) presented to the focus groups: 
Judge 11: [I]n my court we would always consider, always consider in every case 
whether a clean break is appropriate.  That’s the starting point. 
Judge 14: I’m encouraging her [the wife in the case study discussed in the focus 
groups] towards self-sufficiency because I think that’s the principle we’ve got to 
adopt. So I’m saying to her that the transition from married to separated life is not 
a permanent meal ticket and you’ve really got to expect to try and achieve self-
sufficiency as soon as you practically can and I like to get them on the road to 
that.  
But the clean break norm may under-protect economically vulnerable wives. An 
example discussed by a solicitor interviewee involved a husband (the interviewee’s 
client) on a low six-figure income and a wife caring full-time for four young children. The 
clean break outcome gave the wife a little over half of the non-pension capital so she 
could re-house mortgage-free, standard child maintenance, but no pension share or 
spousal periodical payments:  
What they agreed was a very good deal for him, actually in my view. I did say to 
him, if I was acting for the wife, I wouldn’t be advising this. She’s got a clean 
break which, with 4 small children and no income, I thought wouldn’t even get 
past the court, and I said to him and warned him, ‘you know, your danger is this 
isn’t going to get past’. It did. She did get a significant proportion of the capital 
upfront to be able to re-house herself.… I think, from her position, she wanted to 
get out of the matrimonial home and get herself a new property. … I thought it 
[the outcome] worked very well for him because he got the deal he wanted. The 
wife might not think so. [Interviewer: In a few years’ time?] Absolutely, when her 
money’s run out and she’s got no income and 4 small children. … (Solicitor 14) 
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This outcome typifies the so-called ‘present bias’ of many wives / mothers, such that 
they focus on immediate needs (particularly of their children) not their own longer-term 
positions (see Arthur et al, Settling Up: making financial arrangements after separation 
(NatCen, 2002); Perry et al, How parents cope financially on marriage breakdown 
(Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2000)).  Meanwhile, husbands are commonly very 
attached to their pensions:  
Judge 9: Yeah, I mean my experience in a case like [the one presented for 
discussion in the focus group], the wives will always be going for the house and 
the husbands will be hanging on to their pensions for dear life and so the sort of 
… the common scenario is still wife trying to keep the house, whether she can 
afford it or not and very often you’re getting wives saying, you know, borrowing 
money off their parents. 
As that quotation from the focus groups indicates, clean break outcomes may only be 
sustainable with the financial or “in-kind” aid of relatives (especially parents) or new 
partners. This is reflected in Fisher and Low’s analysis of general population data, 
showing that wives’ post-divorce recovery is typically driven not by increased labour 
market attachment or income-transfers from the ex-husband, but by the support of new 
partners or (at least while children were dependent) the state (e.g. Hayley Fisher and 
Hamish Low, ‘Who Wins, Who Loses and Who Recovers from Divorce?’, in J Miles and 
R Probert (eds), Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets (Hart Publishing, 2009) and their 
(2016) article, above). 
Our interview data also indicate that outcomes may sometimes be shaped by the 
parties’ relative psychological strength:  
He was an alpha male and she [worked part-time] and looked after the children. I 
think she probably just saw her role … I think she was just grateful actually to 
have met some of her aims. And even despite me very positively talking about 
what she could achieve and hope to achieve, I don’t think she really thought it 
was worth the effort.…[S]o I think it’s very much the husband’s determination not 
to concede anything very easily and wore her down. Ultimately she got the 
outcome she wanted but it was also the outcome he wanted to give her. So I 
never lost sight of that fact. (Solicitor 25) 
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This raises questions about the approval of such outcomes in consent order 
applications. But hard-pressed judges processing large numbers of applications with 
only the information provided by Form D81 (unless they request more, as they 
occasionally do – we identified just eight examples in the court files of cases that 
suggested unease about a clean break) may prefer to give weight to party autonomy. 
However, our evidence indicates that a clean break does not necessarily mean we 
have two self-supporting parties. The wife (as it typically is) may instead simply be 
reliant on others, or have no obvious adequate alternative means of support. Whether 
such outcomes are ‘dignified’ for the women involved is doubtful. 
The minority with spousal support: it’s (almost) all about the kids 
So what of the minority of cases with orders for spousal support? Official court data 
have since 2006 reported spousal and child periodical payment orders in one figure for 
“periodical payments” (see HMCTS Family Court Statistics Quarterly), so court file 
surveys are needed to distinguish them.  
Our findings were similar to Hilary Woodward with Mark Sefton’s (Pensions on Divorce, 
Cardiff University, 2014: www.nuffieldfoundation.org/pensions-divorce, hereafter 
‘Woodward’). Table 5 sets out the frequency and rate in the two studies of spousal and 
child periodical payments orders (excluding school fees orders); two other cases in our 
study, not included in the table, involved orders for older children. Adding those cases 
where we found positive evidence of child maintenance transfers outside the order 
(e.g. under a calculation made by the statutory agency or privately agreed payments), 
we found child maintenance in around two-thirds of the 225 cases involving a minor 
child of the family. (For more detail, see our paper ‘Child maintenance: the 
arrangements of a financially-engaged population of divorcing parents’, forthcoming; 
we cannot, for the most part, definitely say that no child maintenance was being paid in 
the cases where we found no evidence of it.) 
As for spousal support orders, Table 6 shows the frequency of different types of order 
found in the Hitchings/Miles study. The husband was the sole payer in all bar two 
cases (those two involving mutual orders, with purely nominal obligations for the 
wives). Over 80% (52) of the husband payors were in higher-level occupations. A third 
(21) of the recipient-wives were housewives at the petition (in turn, representing over a 
third of all housewife cases), while the other two-thirds (42) were economically active in 
some way (13% of all economically active wives). 




Table 5: numbers and proportions of court file cases, including periodical payments 
orders (‘pps’) for spouse or for child, comparing authors’ study with other recent study 
Note: Excluding orders for school fees 
Table 6: types of spousal periodical payment order, all cases and of those cases where 
any minor child of the family (‘child cases’) at date of financial order 
 N (all cases) % of all 
cases 
N (child cases) % of child 
cases 
 immediate clean break 
333 83.5 168 74.6 
deferred clean break: 
s28(1A) 28 7 24 10.6 
ongoing provision, 
extendable fixed term 14 3.5 12 5.3 
joint lives 
22 5.5 19 8.4 
no order, but pps not 
dismissed 2 0.5 2 0.8 
Total 399 100 225 100 
 
Joint lives orders were rare (just 22 cases of the 399), constituting only a third of all 64 
spousal support orders in the sample. The median duration of non-joint lives orders 
(calculated by us in relation to the likely first terminating event other than 
death/remarriage etc) was nine years. But the most striking finding (replicating the 
 Hitchings/Miles Woodward 
Sample sizes: 
Total sample size in each study (‘all cases’) 399 369 
N of cases with minor children of family (‘child cases’) 





Periodical payment orders within samples: 
N of cases with pps for spouse 





N of cases with pps for child  
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finding of Eekelaar and Maclean in 1986) is how the spousal support payments were 
actually (almost) all about children:  
- spousal support was almost always confined to cases with children of the 
family;  
- the duration of payments in about three-quarters of the non-joint lives orders 
was linked to the youngest child achieving a milestone (age or education 
stage), though over half of these orders (and a third of all spousal support 
orders) were nominal only, providing just a safety net.  
- only nine of the 64 spousal periodical payment orders did not involve minor 
children of the family: 
o two of these nine were no-child cases (out of a pool of 84 cases with 
either no child at all or no child of the family); these were both non-
extendable fixed term orders, one providing short-term, transitional 
support after a short marriage, the other supporting an older wife 
following a 20+ year marriage; and 
o in the remaining seven cases, spousal support was ordered where the 
children were all independent following marriages of 20+ years, during 
which we may suppose that the wife had been the primary carer (that 
information was not available on file). That there are only seven such 
cases (out of a pool of 90 cases with all-adult children of the family) may 
make us wonder whether at least some of these other women might be 
struggling economically, compared to their ex-husbands, if their earning 
capacity had earlier been compromised by childcare.  
The focus group judges were alive to the challenges that wives looking after children 
post-divorce might encounter in trying to become financially independent.  
Judge 11: I’m a working mother and I see that I can do it and yes you do put in 
place childcare arrangements, you … if you can afford to.  I’ve been lucky I have 
been able to, so you can actually do it, but will this lady [in the case study] be 
able to do it, that’s the question.  … Would she be able to do it with three young 
children, no support from the husband because they’re getting divorced and we 
would have to consider how realistically she will be able to do that and if we do 
look at her situation and children are aged seven, four and two it’s going to be 
very difficult for us to push her to self-sufficiency.   
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Judges were also conscious that wives’ own efforts to improve their economic position 
through paid employment would, over time, interact with the withdrawal of benefits and 
tax credits once the children left their household in a way that might leave them no 
better off overall, and possibly worse off, after the benefits-loss:  
Judge 5: Yeah, but she’s not going to increase her earnings, is she?  She’s just 
going to be able to compensate for the loss of benefits that occurs as her children 
leave home.   
And the judges were conscious of the implications of Universal Credit (UC), which 
alters the situation considerably: where spousal support might hitherto have been one 
of an array of income sources (alongside earnings and tax credits) available to cover 
the needs of the primary carer’s household, spousal (but not child) support receipts are 
included in UC means-testing, reducing UC £ for £ (and see broader concerns raised 
by Gingerbread, Where next on Universal Credit? www.gingerbread.org.uk/policy-
campaigns/welfare-reform/where-next-universal-credit/). 
What about the geography? 
The variation in wealth-level data reported in Table 2a above partly correlates with 
variation in use of clean breaks, evident from Table 2b: Court D had both the lowest 
clean break rate (at 61%) and the wealthiest client base; Court B had 97% clean 
breaks and the least wealthy clients. Concerns have been expressed (not least by the 
Law Commission) about apparent geographical variation in financial remedy case 
outcomes. But our data suggest that a good part of the difference may simply reflect 
the different resources available. Participants in both judicial focus groups did feel that 
there was a predisposition against clean breaks and towards longer-term spousal 
support in one region. But they also felt that economic variation in incomes and 
housing costs were significant, whatever ideological preferences might be in play:  
Judge 7: [T]he idea that there’s a north/south divide on this is actually less 
important than the idea that there’s an “amount of money” divide.  … With 
[Region 3] housing costs that doesn’t take you very far.  And you’re much more 
likely to allow the maintenance to run on much longer in that sort of case, than 
whereas if you’re presumably in [location 5A], where you’re in a different world.  
And there’s a good deal of myth making about, you know, everybody’s fact-
specific; everybody’s looking at the facts that they particularly deal with, and we 
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in [Region 3] … are dealing with a lot of cases where fact-specific reasons, you 
need to ... delay a clean break.   
Where living costs are lower, child support payments might be adequate to meet that 
household’s needs (along with other sources of income, including benefits and tax 
credits – many of those dependent on the children’s presence), so that spousal support 
is not required to help make ends meet: 
Judge 7: The thing is this: that child support is going to be enough for most 
people up to a certain level. And it’s only when you get above that level that you 
really start looking at spousal seriously. I think one of the reasons for regional 
variation here is exactly that. The myth is that everybody up north terminates 
spousal support immediately.  And if it’s true, it’s because they get enough from 
child maintenance not to need spousal support.   
By contrast, where living (especially housing) costs are higher, primary carers, past 
and present, might need more support from the ex-spouse to sustain an acceptable 
standard of living. 
Concluding thoughts 
Evidence-based policy and law-making that seeks to identify and understand the lived 
realities of ‘everyday’ couples who have experienced divorce are indispensable. 
Despite all the media attention attracted by cases in which joint lives awards are made 
(or, recently, lost), the ‘meal ticket for life’ award is, in practice, rare. But, as Moylan LJ 
affirmed in Waggott (at [156]), that does not mean that spousal support, even joint lives 
support, has no role in mitigating the (typically gendered) economic disparity exposed 
on divorce: in some cases it is an important tool for helping to achieve a fair economic 
outcome. The option of spousal periodical payments may also provide an important 
bargaining tool to help secure fairer clean break settlements. Our findings suggest a 
close link between spousal support and children. So it may be concerning that these 
orders were made in only a minority of those cases, especially once the children are 
adult. Our court file data can only provide a snapshot of the parties’ positions on 
divorce – we cannot know what were the longer-term outcomes for the individuals in 
our survey, in particular how many ex-wives alleviated any continuing economic 
disadvantage by repartnering. But, as forty years ago, the greater problem may not be 
over-generosity to ex-wives, but the enduring, disproportionate economic impact of 
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divorce on women. This is clear from the longitudinal survey data (which in turn is 
unsurprising given the labour market data) and, quite possibly, also from the fact that 
two-thirds of divorcing spouses are not invoking this jurisdiction at all.  
Some might argue that the solution lies in increased female labour market participation 
and equal pay. Further work is undoubtedly needed to enable more equal sharing of 
paid and unpaid labour within marriage and other relationships. But it is not clear that 
couples can or should be required to arrange their lives that way. And it is certainly not 
clear that the law of financial remedies should be reformed in order drastically to curtail 
the support it offers long before that more equal society has arrived.  
Rather than being ‘undignified’, or reflective of or reinforcing a ‘victim mentality’, 
receiving the benefit of orders that acknowledge the economic impact of how a couple 
have chosen – or have been required by circumstance – to raise their children protects 
the dignity of the primary carer, more fairly distributing between the parties the full 
economic impacts, positive and negative, of their marital partnership. 
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